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THE WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY:

MAKING THE CASE FOR PRIVATE INDUSTRY FILTERING
TO CONTROL EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND
TRANSNATIONAL INTERNET CENSORSHIP CONFLICTS

I. I NTRODLICTION

Creators of internet content and corporations that utilize internet portals
internationally should be aware of two issues that will come before the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) this November. The first issue is
unlawful content and the second is access protection. This note explores the
manner in which various countries plan on handling these issues. I The conclusions reached at the WSIS may affect what is accessible on the Internet, and if
content creators will be liable for violating foreign laws in various jurisdictions
simply for publishing certain materials on the Internet.
This paper specifically addresses foreign assertion of jurisdiction over
Internet content creators and proposes means to avoid the chilling effect foreign
assertion of jurisdiction inevitably has on speech and Internet based commerce.
Part II of this paper provides a brief background on both the

wsrs

and the

Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), and outlines the problems

I See Working Group on Inlerne! Govcrnance. IsslIe Pal'er Oil [illiallflli COlllell1 alld Access
I'rolccli(}//. amilahl!! al http://wgig.org/docsiWP-LJnlawfuIConlcnl.pdf(last visited Mar. 19. 20()S). '''Unlawful
content' retCrs to contcnt thai is deemcd illegal. That is, Ihe origination, production, and somelimes even
consumplion, oCthe content can resull in prosecution and conviction in a court of law. 'Access protection' refers
to the parlial or complete denial of access on the grounds that the content may be illcgal, exploited for criminal
ends, or potentially harmful. Such denial may be necessary 10 prolect end-uscrs (such as children). potcntial
victims, or even content intermediaries sllch as Inlernet scrvice providers." Id. ~ I.
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created by the widely used effects-based jurisdiction. Part III discusses the three 2
main alternatives for conferring jurisdiction over Internet content and regulating
access: (1) effects-based jurisdiction, (2) target-based jurisdiction, and (3) private
industry filtering. Finally, Part III also analyzes how well each method balances
governmental law enforcement interests against the interests of individual free
speech and explains why the WGIG and the WSIS must adopt private industry
filtering as the preferred method for dealing with Internet jurisdiction.

II.

BACKGROUND

The World Summit on the Information Society is "held under the high
patronage

of

the

UN

Secretary-General,

with

[the

International

Telecommunication Union (lTU)) taking the lead role in preparations."3 The
WSIS convened because "world leaders decided that a global vision and a global
dialogue were needed to build the framework of an all-inclusive and equitable
Information Society."-I

2 In reality, there arc more than three alternatives to addres, the problem of Internet jurisdiction. For
example, it has been proposed that an international organization should be created which would regulate the
Internet. SI!I! John Zarocostas, UN. Cmlll) Sl!eks COlllrol o/llllallel, C()~II'IIII,R CRI~lIc RlcSlcARlll Clto:HR, Nov.
IS, 2003, ({I http://www.crime-research.org/news/2003111/MessIX02.html( last vi,ited Mar, X, 20()S). However,
the viability of this solution is questionablc as it tilces strong opposition trom some free-market nations. 1d.
Additionally, due to ··the broad differences in culture and law. it is extremely ditlieult to come to an objective
judgment on whether some content is acceptable or unlawful." Working Group on Internet Governance. ISSIII!
Pi/PO; .I'llI'm note I. at I. Finally, it is not clear if such an organiEation would e\entually address the issue of
speech or stick to areas of relative universal agreement such as fraud. Therefore, while other solutions exist,
only the three solutions, which, in the opinion of the author, arc most probable. will be discu"ed.
3 International Telecommunication Union, B({ckgrolll/(1 ({lid Origills of Iii I! SlIlIIlIlil. ({I http://www.
itu.int/wsis/basic/baekgrountl.html (last visited Mar. 19, 200S),
4 International Telecommunication Union. Fre'!lIelll!I' I"ked Qlleslioll,l'
o,! Will' il Iilere ({ 1f'(II'ld
http: /\\'ww.itu.inl!wsis/basic/faqs.asp tlast visited Mar. 19. 20()S).

SlIlIUllit olllile III/i)J'Jllillioll S()Cil!tl':), ({I
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The WSIS consists of two chronological phases; the first was completed
in Geneva during December, 2003. 5 As part of the first phase, the WSIS requested
the establishment of a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)J' The
WG IG 's duty is "to investigate and make proposals for action ... on governance
of the Internet," which will be considered in the second phase of the WSIS set to
take place November 16-18, 2005 in Tunisia.7
Two issues identified by the WGIG thus far, unlawful content and accesS
protection,X are currently on the WSIS agenda. Thus, the WGIG and the WSIS
provide the perfect opportunity to address and deal with global Internet
jurisdiction problems and more specifically, the problems arising from effeetsbased jurisdiction. The opportunity is timely, as efTects-based jurisdiction is
quickly becoming the primary method employed for determining proper
jurisdiction. 9
EfTects-based jurisdiction allows for exercise of jurisdiction whenever
one element of a crime is committed in the forum state. IO It is not necessary that
all of the clements be committed in one forum. I I Under the effects-based

5 International Telecommunication Union, Background, sl/pra note 3.

6 World SUlllmit on the Ini(mnation Society. Dec/llmtiol1 0/ Pril1C1j)/i's. Buildil1g thi' Ill/imlllltioll
SOCii'tL A C/o/w/ C//(///i'llge ill thi' Xi'll' ;\1i//elll1iulII. ('.N. Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVAi[)OC4-E (Dec. 12,2(03),
a\'(Ji/ah/e at http://www.itu.intiwsisidocs/geneva/ofticial/dop.html(iast visited Apr. 26, 20(5).
7 1<1.: International Telecomlllunication Union, Backgrolilld . .I'llI'm note 3.

X Si'i' Working Group on Internet GO\ ernance. ISSlIi' Paper . .I'llI'm note I.
9 Michael Geist. The Lcga/llllj)/ic(/ti,)//s o//hi' )illlOo.' Il1c. NII~i /"!1!lIlOm/,,'!ia /Jisl'lI/i'.· AI1 Il1ter"ic)\'
"'ith Pro/i>,I'sor Micjllli!/ (/i'ist . .II ilns(,()~I.'Jf r. Jan. IX. 20(l!. lit http://www.juriscolll.nctieniunildoc/yahoo/geis(.
htllli (bst visited April 26.20(5) I hereinafter Geist. Na~i ,Ifelllomhi/ia Oisplite I (interviews with Michael Geist

organized by Lionel Thoumyre).
I () Ray August, /lIti'rl/atio//al erher-jurisdictioll . .1 COllljJaratil'c Allalrsis, 39 A~d. Bus. L.J. 531,
536 (2002).

II !d. at 537.

285

INTERNATIONAL LAW

&

MANAGEMENT REVIEW

Spring 2005

analysis, a court has jurisdiction when that jurisdiction feels the negative effects
or harm from the action.
Various cases use an effects-based analysis to assert jurisdiction over
Internet related content. 12 In particular, the United States uses this analysis to
assert jurisdiction over foreign entities in cases involving fraud and child pornography.1J These cases go unnoticed because censorship of child pornography and
fraud are areas of near universal agreement. 14 However, the story is quite
different when courts usc effects-based analysis to assert jurisdiction to censor
content that does not enjoy similar universal agreement. International attempts to
regulatc Internet content and online commerce will suffer from the contradictory
standards and conflicting judicial rulings of diverse international jurisdictions.
Additionally, Internet content creators may face criminal charges in foreign
nations even though the offending content is legal in their own country.15
Accordingly, content providers, fearing lawsuits, will refrain from posting
content on the Internet despite being legally sanctioned or protected in their
localities. Consequently, effects-based jurisdiction schemes threaten to restrain ecommerce and ultimately chill free spccch. This chilling effect will be illustrated
more fully by analyzing the effects-based jurisdiction utilized in the French case

UEJF and Licra v. Yahoo! Il1c. and Yahoo France (Yahoo!).'!'

121d.at5373S .
. 13 Mathe\\ Fagin, Comlllent, /?cgu/o{ill,!!, 5})('('('1I lcros,\ Bordcn, Technology \'s. ""uc.\,
TLL[(()~l~t. & nllt. L. REV. 395.449 (2003).

C) rV11(,11.

14 1£1.

15 Working Group on Internct Governance, Issll~ P"I'~r. \1I/,m notc I, at I.
16 LJEJF ct L1CRA v. Yahoo' Inc. ct Yahoo Francc, TG.1. Paris, May 22, 20()(), N° RG: 00 /05308,
obs. C'.Bcnsoal11 & lGol11c/, tralls/a/ioll ami/ah/!! a/ hltp:!/\\ww.juriscol11.nct/txLjurislrictiiyauctions2000052
2.htl11 (last visitcd Apr. 2620(5).
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III.

TIIREE ALTERNATIVE METHODS

A. Effects-hased Jltrisdiction

The French case UEJF and Licra

1'.

Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France

effectively illustrates thc problems inherent in effects-based jurisdiction schemes.
Yahoo.' demonstrates how an etTccts-based analysis unduly grants foreign courts
jurisdiction over viliually all Intemet content. Moreover, it illustrates how widesweeping jurisdiction creates contlicts in determining what is legal to post on
intemationally accessible Internet sites.
In Yahoo!. a French court found Yahoo! Inc. guilty of violating French

law that prohibits the display of Nazi memorabilia. 17 Although Yahoo! Inc.
clearly had no intention of violating French law and the Nazi memorahilia
represented a marginal portion of the content available on its broadly inclusive
auction site, in May 2000, the French judge deemed French COUlts as competent
to preside over the dispute because Intemet surfers in France suffered damage. lx
The French Interim COUli afTirmed the decision on similar grounds. That court
concluded that although Yahoo! 's auction site is generally directed at users in the
United States, as evidenced by the terms of delivery, language, cUlTency, and
methods of payment used, the sale of Nazi memorabilia could not be considered
as directed only at U.S. consumers because it "may be of interest to any
person."I'! Thus, according to the French Interim Court, the mere fact that harm

17 !d.

I X'el.
19 ULIF ct LlCRA v. Yahoo' Inc. ct Yahoo Franec, Tej.1. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, N° Rei: OO/0530S,
obs. J .Ci0I11C7, Iralls/ali()// a\"ili/"hf£! al http://www.cdl.org,'spcccil'intcrnational/OO 1120yahoofrancc.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 20(5).
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was felt in France and the fact that Yahoo! Inc. had at least some ability to
determine a user's origin were enough to grant the French court competent
jurisdiction. 20
The French Interim Court's assertion of jurisdiction created a large
public outcry,2l particularly in the United States. This outcry is rooted in the
possibility that other countries will adopt the dangerous precedent set by the
French Interim Court's decision to assert foreign jurisdiction in speech related
cases that affect international commerce. 22 Opponents of effects-based
jurisdiction stress that it will lead to "a jurisdictional morass, an overabundance
of jurisdictional claims, and an undesirable increase in the cost of online
publication. "23

It is impOliant to note that the French case did not regulate the sale of
Nazi items, which more traditional methods would typically regulate. Rather, the

Yuhoo! ruling focused specifically on the mere display of Nazi memorabilia. 24 If
other countrics adopt the Yahoo! court's rationale, any country with Internet
access will assert jurisdiction over all content on the I nternet because potentially
objectionable material may have been displayed in that country.2S This will
inevitably lead to contradictory standards and judicial rulings, as each country
attempts to regulate Internct content regardless of its origin or directed

20 Id.

2l

Geisi. ,vll~i i'vtenlOmhilia /)il/,II/e. SlIl}m no Ie 9.

22/d.
23 Fugin •.Ill!'/"({ note 13. al 407.

24 BCIl Lauric, All Expert\- Ap%gr. AI'ACm-ssL.ol{(;, Nov. 21, 20()O. III http: Iwww.apache-ssl.org/
apology.hlml (Iasl visiled Mar. 7, 2(05).
25 Fagin, slIpra nole 13, al 410 II.
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audience. 2(' In fact, a U.S. District court has already refused to enforce the French
decision in the U.S.,n legitimizing critics' fears that inconsistent rulings will
provide additional compliancc costs and impact contcnt providcrs' cost-benefit
analyses.
The logical extension of the Yahoo.' rationale is that every intemct
publishing entity will be forced to implement and "maintain a huge matrix of
pages versus jurisdictions to see who can and can't sec what."2x The cost and
effort seem pointless or frivolous when one considers the case with which
filtering technology can protect various Intemet users.2,! Nevertheless, even if
filtering technology is effective, how will online content providers know whether
they are violating laws in countries all over the world? Will corporations be
required to hire lawyers in each nation to inspect every piece of questionable
material? Conversely, must entities refrain from publishing material that is
questionable by any stretch of the world's collective imagination? By using
international content filtering,JO content providers may avoid potential liability
and online content censorship, but such a course will aggregate into a global
chilling effect on speech and online commerce.
Support for the fear of a chilling effect can be found in Yahoo! 's response
to the French decision and CompuServe's response to a similar situation

.I.

IVI'I

26 Rinat Hadas. Case COll1ll1cnt. IlIleriloliollollllll'rIIl'I.llIrisiliclio/l." Whose Lml' is Righ(). 15 I'u .
L. 299. 307 (2002).
27 Yahoo'. Inc. \. LICRA. 169 F. Slirp. 2d IIHI (N.D. Cal. 2(01).
28 Lauric. slIpra note 24.

29 Iii.
30 Fagin . .1'11,,,.0 note 13. at 414 15.
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involving Germany in 1995. 31 In both cases, the Internet service provider blocked
the offensive content rather than spend resources implementing centralized,
nation-specific filters. 32 Extraterritorial restriction of speech, conflicting laws,
and increased costs of Internet publication all bolster the fears and criticisms of
effects-based jurisdiction."
Some, however, argue that fears of ctTects-based jurisdiction are
unfounded. For example, Jaek Goldsmith, professor of law at the University of
Chicago Law School, posits that cyberspace transactions do not truly differ from
traditional transnational transactions and can be similarly

regulated.l~

He

provides several examples of non-Internet related cases in which laws arc applied
extraterritorially with negative spillover effects.]) He points out that while these
spillover effects are the central problem of effect-based jurisdiction, they are
inevitable because the social and economic cost of eliminating them is too highY,
Therefore, the spillover effects of extraterritorial application of other countries'

31 CompuScrvc was thrcatencd with a lawsuit in Deccmber 1995 Illr allowing (ierman CompuScrvc
subscribers to access discussion groups containing pornographic materials in violation of German law. In
rcsponse, CompuServe unilaterally blocked access to the discussion groups, effectively blocking the groups for
all subscribcrs world-wide. Eventually, CompuServe again allowed acce" atlcr making filtering technology
available to their (Jerman suhscribcrs. However. the German prosecutor notified COlllpuScrvc that ~lIch efforts
were still not in cOlllpliance with (iennan laws. Felix SOIll III , head of COlllpuServe Dcutschland was
subsequently given a suspendcd t\Hl year sentence j(,r violalion of (jerman law. The conviction was then
revcrsed a ycar latcr by a superior court. 5;~i! Jack L. (;oldsmilh, Aglliml ('d)~/"({//{{rc"I', (,5 U, CIII, L. REV,
1199, 1224 .. 25 (199g): Associated Press. ('OIl/PIISI.'!"l'e Et-O!liei"I,~ 1'0,.,,-( 'lise ( 'o/ll'ielioll Ri!l'ersul (No\', 17,
1999), IImiiahle III http://www.cybcr-rights,org/isps/sollllll-dcc,hlill (last visited Apr. 26, 2()05) 1hcreinatlcr
Associated Press, COII/IJ/lS~n'e I,
lI'ilh

(1/1

32 Goldsmith, I'llI'm note 31. at 1224; Marc Le Mcnestrel ct aI., 1111",.,,('/ H-elhics ill COlljl"fJIIlalioll
ActiJ'isls ',lgelldll: },i/W(),' Oil Trilll, al http;/lwww,econ,upfcsidceholl1e/what/wpapersiposlscripls:577,

pdf (Nov, 200 I) (last visitcd Apr. 26. 2(05)
33 Fagin,

\"lI/)/'((

note 13, at 40X, 414 15,

34 Goldsmith, .I'llI'm note 31, at 120(),
35 I d,atI21112.
36 /", at 1212.
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laws do not originate from applying national law to internationally available
Internet sitesY The problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction and compliance
existed previously, and the existing tools of modern conflict laws and tech-nology
deal with them as ably as they wi II with the spi lIover efTects of extraterritorial
Internet regulation.:l X Professor Goldsmith docs not mean to say that laws will not
change, but rather, countries can regulate Internet publication and commerce just
as they regulate transnational transactions.:1'!
One important fact supports Goldsmith's argument: while a country may
theoretically impose its laws on the world, practically speaking, enforcement of
those laws depends on the country's ability to implement them internationally.40
A country's power to enforce its laws is tied to its ability to attach any assets the
accused entity may maintain in the country.41 However, most Internet users and
online publishers do not maintain assets abroad:'" Thus, it seems that fears of
freedom of speech restraints imposed by a ruling in a foreign court have little to
no practical basis. 4 :1 Foreign rulings will primarily alTect multinational corporations that maintain assets in the regulating jurisdiction. 44 Just as multinational
corporations already accept liability in brick and mOliar transactions they will
start to include liability costs associated with associated click and mortar

37 Ill.

3S Iii.

at

1213.

39 Iii. at 120001. 1213.
40 Iii. at 121 (, 17.
41 Iii.

42 Id. at 1217.
-13 Sel! it!.

44 Id.
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enterprises in cost-benefit analyses prior to investing significant assets in foreign
jurisdictions. 45
The Yahoo! case reinforces and enhances Goldsmith's reasoning. Due to
the subsequent U.S. District Court case, Yahoo! Inc. did not implement the
filtering mandated by the French court. 46 Although they removed the
objectionable material,47 it is not likely that Yahoo! Inc. will implement the
filtering in the near future unless they acquire direct assets in France that could
be used to enforce the French ruling. 4x In summary, Goldsmith concludes that
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction is unlikely to stifle individual or corporate
online speech.49
Goldsmith's enforceability analysis is logical and practical for
companies. However, according to the aftermath of both the Yahoo! and
CompuServe cases, it is unlikely that individuals and companies will remain
unatTected by court rulings. In both cases the content found on these companies'
servers was not placed there by the company, but by individual users. Goldsmith
briefly mentions the possibility of indirect effects on users who arc dependent on
service providers with a presence in the regulating jurisdiction, but he does not
give it much consideration.51) In the Yahoo! case, individuals sold Nazi memora-

45 Fagin, supm note 13. at 417 I X (summarizing (ioldsmith, supm note 31 ).

46 See Yahoo', Inc. v. LlCRA, 169 F. Supp. 2d II XI (N .D. Cal. 200 I); Hadas, supm note 26, at
307 OX.
47 The Associated Press & Reuters, 1,i/lOo' Na::i AucliIJII Hall Weicollled (Jan. 3, 200 I), ami/ahle a/
htlp:llarchivcs.ellll.coIl1/200 I IWOR 1.D/cllropC/O I dB/nel.hate/ (last visited Apr. 26. 200,).
4g See Le Menestrcl, sllpra note 32.

49 See Goldsmith, slIpra notc 3 I, at 1217.

SOld.
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bilia on Yahoo's auction website."1 In CompuServe, individual users posted
information to discussion groupS.S2 Thus, the Internet Service Provider and the
individual content provider were arguably distinct entities. Both companies
currently state in their terms of service that the individual users will be responsible for any unlawful information posted on the Internet through their service. 53
Despite such attempts to ascribe liability for content away from the company,
Yahoo! Inc. specifically changed its user agreement to prohibit Nazi memorabilia
as a result of the French Yahoo! case. 54 Additionally, at the time of the French
Yahoo.' case, Yahoo! Inc.'s terms of service stipulated that the site was governed

by the laws of the United States. 55 However, in light of the Yahoo! case, this type
of service agreement's terms and choice of law provisions do not seem to deter
courts from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over content providers. 56
Ultimately, these agreements and provisions

otTer little protection to content

providers who are forced to remove objectionable material f1'om their online
portals for fear of lawsuits and possible fines.
Although individual content creators may be immune to assertions of
foreign jurisdiction as Goldsmith argues, online content and portal providers are
restrained through the assertion of jurisdiction over service providers. Those

51 Le MencstreL slIlJra note 32. ~ I J.
52 Associated Press. (·o/IIIJlISen'<,. slIpra note 31.

53 Yahoo'. Terms of Sen'ice. al'ailah/" ,II http://docs.yahoo.comlint(1'tcrms! (last visited Mar. 7.
2()05): COlllpllScrvc. Tams of ese. al'ai/ah/" al hilI': I\vehccntcrs.colllpllscrvc.cOIl1/COll1pllScrvcltnCIlli'tcnns .
.isp (last visited Mar. 7. 20(J)).
54 Fagin. slIpra note 13. at 424 25.

Bt:Rnl!-Y

55 Michael A. Geist. /.I Thel'e a Thel'e Thel'e:' To\l'{/I'{/ Greal('/' Cer/aill/)' fiJI' IIl/e/'l1e/.Iurisdictioll. 16
n.ll!. L.J. 1345. 1350 (2(JOI) I hereinafter Cicisl. Is There ({ There Ther,,:'I.
56 Id. at

14()(1
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placing lawsuits need not go after individuals posting objectionable content.
There is greater incentive to go after the companies or web pOl1als that provide
access to the information. If all major companies restrict or block objectionable
material for fear of foreign lawsuits, individual expression of thought and opinion
will be severely restrained as will the companies' ability to successfully operate
online publication services. Online services like discussion boards, web hosting
services, or auctions on sites such as Yahoo!, MSN, AOL, CompuServe, Amazon,
and eBay will no longer be able to provide forums for individual expression and
free speechY Individuals will be left to maintain their own web server, find a
lesser known company unafraid of litigation, or find a company willing to
publish such information for a fcc.
If there is a demand or desire for such information, it will always be
found on the Internet.5 x However, part of the value in serviccs like Yahoo! or
eBay is that they arc inexpensive, well known, and frcquently visited.
Considering the immense size of the Internet and thc innumerable websites
available, the greatest utility that services like eBay or Yahoo! otTer is the large
number of visitors that are likely to sec and have ready access to the information.
Thus, limiting the comprehensive scope of the services and content provided by
these well-known companies will stifle the free flow of information and
expressIon.

- 57 In addition to the cases against Yahoo' Inc. and CompuServe, suits have been threatened against
eBay.com. Amazon.com. and Barnesandnoblc.com t(lr the sale ofNa7i and KKK items as well as Hitler's Meill
KUlllp/. These threats have caused these retailers to cither block or restrict the sale of such items despite their
legality in the United States. Le Menestrcl, SlI/J}'(/ note 32, ~ 1.1. 5'-ee a/so Fagin, slIl'ra note 13, at 425 n.92;
Steve Kettmann,
//e
II'JII'I Joill
,111J(COII \
'Kallll'/",
WIf{I[).l'()~I,
Dec.
2,
1999, al
hllp:llwww.wired.comillcwsiprillt. 0, t 294,32~35,()().htllll (last visilcd Apr. 2(', 2()()5).
5~ Geist, !Va~i lv/el/lOrahi/ia Di,lp"/e, IIIl'ra note 9.
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The greater the number of countries that use efTects-based jurisdiction,
the greater the chilling ctTect on speech. Even though individuals may escape
intemationallitigation, the restrictions placed on companies and web servers will
still inhibit freedom of expression. Therefore, for the sake of protecting free
expression and transnational commerce, the WGIG and the WSIS must take steps
to curb the use of effects-based jurisdiction.

B. Twget-hased .Jurisdictiol1

Target-based jurisdiction is one possible alternative that seeks to avoid
the negative aspccts of ctTects-based analysis. 59 A target-bascd analysis attempts
to identify the intent ofthc online content provider by considering the actions and
efforts of content providers to target or not target a specific forum or audience. 6o
This type of analysis provides predictability and certainty for online publishers
and helps eliminate the spillover ctTects of an effects-based analysis as publishers
may avoid jurisdictions where they wish to avoid court actions.(,1
Despite its benefits, target-based analysis is not likely to replace ctTectsbased analysis. COUlis are reluctant to use this analysis if local harm would go
uncorrected when servers and websites unintended for that locality are
immunized under target-bascd analyscs. 62 Thcreforc, many courts arc likely to

59 Geist, Is ThC're II Thae TltC'/"C':', SIII}m note 55. at 13g0 XI.
hO Id. at 13g0.

61 Id. at 1380 g I.
62 Fagin, .I'llI'm note 13, at 436.
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continue employing the wider reaching effects-based analysis. 63 In the case of
speech and censorship, laws vary greatly from country to country.
In order for the target-based analysis to work, there must be a standard
for determining when a publisher is targeting a forum. 64 A targeted relationship
that subjects the individual or company to a foreign country's jurisdiction should
require more certainty than an dTects-based analysis. 6' Whatever the standard is,
it must be teehnologieally neutral.(,6 For example, it may be appropriate today to
consider the language and currency used on a particular website when
determining which jurisdictions the content creator has targeted. 67 However,
emerging technologies allow for real-time language and currency conversion and
limit the value of such criteria for accurate target determination.IlK The targeting
standard must also be content neutral to avoid favoring any interest group over
another (e.g. buyers over sellers or consumers over manufacturers). 6<)
One appropriate criterion for determining when a publisher is targeting a
forum is foreseeability.711 This criterion would depend upon the following factors:
contracts, technology, and actual or implied knowledge.7 1 Individually, none of
these factors are determinative, but each is important to a proper foreseeability
analysis. 72

63 Iii.
64 Cieist, Is There

65 See iii.
66 / <1.

67 !d. at 1384 85.

68 1d.
69 It!.

at

1385.

70 It!.

7IM
72 !d. at 1386.
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First, contracts provide evidence of foreseeability as to jurisdiction; and
the value of contract forum selection clauses depends on the terms of the contract
as well as the manner in which the parties consent to the contrac1.13 Based on U.S.
court decisions, if the user is required to assent to the terms and conditions using
clickable icons such as 'I agree' icons, courts are more likely to enforce these
mutually agreed upon termsJl Courts arc less likely to enforce non-consensual
agreements. Thus, if the terms and conditions arc merely contained on a separate
page that the user can choose to read or not, the

COUlt

may find no assent between

the parties. 75
Perhaps more important than the way in which parties assent to forum
selection clauses is the reasonableness of the contract terms. Courts will
generally weigh the forum selection clause in light of the reasonableness of the
clause, the ties to the selected forum, and the laws of the selected forum. Such
considerations are taken to prevent a race-to-the-bottom effect where companies
try to contract into the most favorable jurisdiction despite other eonsiderations.?6
Incidentally, while the presence of a contract forum selection clause may
enhance the ability of a court to determine the foreseeability of a targeted
audience, the absence of such a clause may also allow the courts to deduce the
website's intended users. Rather than a standard contract, some web sites provide
uscrs with the opportunity to key in his or her jurisdiction, which information
determines whether or not the website wi II allow the L1ser access to its site.?7 This
73 Id.

74 Id. at 13X7.

75 1£1.
76ld.atl391
77 Id. at 1391 92.
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type of subjective access granting based on location proves the online provider's
intent to target a particular audience and restrict access in particular jurisdictions.7 x This process makes the web provider's intent more apparent; however,
when prescribing jurisdiction, courts will still consider the case with which users
can circumvent such provisions in order to gain access to the site.7 9
The second factor that may determine whether or not a web provider has
foreseeably targeted a particular jurisdiction is technology. As new technologies
continue to emerge, websites have thc ability to detcrmine the user's geographic
location with increasing aceuraey.xo Once the provider identifies the user's
geographic location, the website can alter or prevent the user's access in order to
avoid that particular jurisdiction. Accordingly, modcrn technology can constructively help courts to determine the content creator's intent to target or avoid a
particular jurisdiction.
For example, some of these technologies can determine the user's
location by focusing on the uscr's IP (internct Protocol) addrcss. Various proprictary products arc produccd to determinc a uscr's location, many of which boast
up to 99% accuracy.XI Alternatively, other new tcchnologies collcct location
information voluntarily from uscrs, typically through attributc cCltificatcs and
credit card information. X2

7X 1<1. at 1391.

79 1<1. at 1392.
80 SI.'I.' id. at 1393.
81 1£1. at 1397.

82 1d. at 1398 99. An attribute certiticalc is a digitally signed certiiicate that presenh information
about a particular user, such as geographic location, without providing the user's identity. The digitally signed
certiticates also prove ditlicult fiJr other Internet users to i',rge. Id.
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As online entities improve upon existing technologies and continue to
develop new technologies, they will increase their accuracy in determining a
user's location. Consequently, they will possess increased capabilities to allow,
block, or change the content viewed by certain users, based upon the user's
specific jurisdiction. When analyzing technology as a factor in the foreseeability
of online providers' liability in particular jurisdictions, courts should not require
online entities to use specific methods to identify a user's location but should
merely consider the technologies available and used at the time. x3
The final factor of the foreseeability test in target-based jurisdiction is
actual or implied knowlcdge. x4 Actual knowledge of a user's location can be
determined through geographic location technology, shipment of goods, receipt
of contact emails, etc. X:; COUlis have typically attributed implied knowledge to
defendants in defamation, tort, libe!, and illegal gambling cases where the
offending party should have been aware of the cause of his or her actions in the
targeted jurisdictions. X(, The actual or implied knowledge factor prevents
companies from hiding behind contract clauses and technological screening
initiatives when in fact they knew or should have known that users from a
particular jurisdiction accessed their site. X7
If target-based analyses employ foreseeability tests that include weighing
the three factors discllssed ahove, they would effectively allow online entities to

R3 Iii. at 1401.
X4 Id. at 140~.
R5 Iii. at \397. 1403.
R(' Id. at 1402.

X7 Iii.
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predict which courts may prescribe jurisdietion over them. xx This in turn would
allow them to avoid areas that they are unprepared or unwilling to enter. X9 It
would remedy the costly speech-chilling and commerce inhibiting results of
effects-based jurisdiction as online entities operating under a target-based regime
would know of and have the ability to control which courts would have
jurisdiction over them.
However, as stated above, countries are unlikely to adopt this method if
they need to rely on foreign cOUlis to correct the harm. Until a significant number
of countries articulate and acccpt a standard test, each country will havc its own
mcthod of determining when an online provider has targeted a particular forum,
making it difficult to realize the benefits of the target-based approach.
Essentially, this creates the same problems already evident in an effects-based
jurisdiction because jurisdictional standards are only predictable if the targeting
tests are standardized internationally. Therefore, in order for the WSIS to
effectively implement this method, it must accomplish the overwhelming task of
both articulating an acceptable and reliable standard

([lid

convincing nations to

forego exercising jurisdiction, even in cases where perceived and actual harms go
uncon·ected.
C. Private Illdllstl), Filtering

Another method of regulating Internet speech and commerce without
unforeseen and unwanted extraterritorial effects is private industry filtering.
~~ !d. at 1404.
89 1<1.
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According to this mcthod, countries require Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or
users to install software to filter content deemed illegal or offensive by that
country.90 This approach has three major advantages over the previous two
methods.
First, it gives each country the ability to regulate speech according to its
own standards without the need to enforce extratelTitorial jurisdiction over
foreign ISPs.91 Filtering information at the national level allows governments to
control what users view within their borders without concern for what ISPs post
in other countries. Therefore, individuals can view information according to the
speech laws of their respective country and online entities can publish without the
fear of extratelTitorial spillovers because each nation will only enforce its own
laws rather than attempting to impose borders on Internet speech and commerce.
Second, filtering gives each country greater control over the enforcement
of its

laws.9~

Rather than issuing potentially unenforceable decisions, as in the

Yahoo! case, countries could enforce their decisions by threatening to blacklist
the offending foreign company.'!) The threatened company could then evaluate its
economic interest within that country and decide whether or not to comply with
that particular country's mandate. 94 Regardless of whether the ISP values access
to that country and complies or decides to continue its regular activities and
forego access, the government will remove the offensive and illegal information.

90 See Fagin. slIl'm note 13. at 451.
91 Id.

92 SI''' id. at 451
93 See it!. at 451 52.
94 Sell id. at 452 53.
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Third, private industry filtering docs not significantly increase the cost of
online publication. Rather than placing the economic burden of maintaining "a
huge matrix of pages versus jurisdictions"'») for each online content provider,
local ISPs would be responsible for filtering according to its country's laws and
could spread the expense among local subscribers.
Private industry filtering is a logical answer to online jurisdictional
problems; however, certain negative effects may prevent implementation. First,
the economic costs may be greater than originally thought. The threat of worldwide liability may cause global providers, such as America Online (AOL), to pull
out of regions rather than comply with filtering requirements.% Second, many
countries have laws that limit the liability of ISPs.')7 In these countries, courts do
not perceive ISPs as content providers but as conduits for access to the

Intemet.9~

These countries would fear restricting access to the Internet if such a plan would
impose financial and technical liability on local ISPs.')<)
One final negative effect of required filtering by ISPs is the potentially
abusive power it lends to governments, opening the doors for repression of
speech, as in China or Libya. loo Critics fear that such an increase in governmental
power to control content will create a society akin to that of George Orwell's 'Big

95 See Lauric, slIpm note 24.
96 Stevc Kcttll1Hnn, //Il()lha lIaie Sile Trial ill Fmllce, WlRlll NI
wircd.coll1/ncws/politics /O,12X3,4490X,OO.htll1l (last visited Apr.26, 2(05).

\\'S.

June 29, 2001, al http://www.

97 Fagin, supm note 13, at 453.
9S Id.

99 Iii.
100 Kercll1 Batir, Regulalillg I/ale Speech Oil Ihe IIl/('I'llel: L'llililfera/islII \' MullilulcralislI/,
L£I\I', ul http:' inct-tr.org.tr'inctconfX"1I111111l.'77.puf (Ia,t vi,itcu Mar. 9, 2(05).

Techll/(Iue \'
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Brother' novc\.11I1 This fear appears to stem from the past acts of speech-

repressive govemments, such as China, where authorities jail individuals for
posting pro-democracy statements on the Intemet, IO~ or Iran whcre police
arrested 70 schoolchildren for using the Internet to alTange dates.l<n Rather than
trusting governments to refrain from abusing this power, critics of private

industry filtering prefer altemative censorship methods.
Despite the criticisms outlined above, private industry filtering is the best
of the three alternatives discussed in this article. Although some ISPs may choose
to pull out of a rcgion rather than comply with a country's monitoring and
filtering laws, a private filtering regime can reduce these companies' concerns
about high economic costs by limiting their liability through other legal means.
ISP liability, for example, could be limited to allow only governmental agencies
to take legal action against them for failure to make a reasonable and good faith
effort to comply with filtering laws. lo4 Although filtering compliance costs may
be high for ISPs, the cost to content providers such as Yahoo! Inc. are similarly
high. ISPs actually have the advantage over content providers because they have
the ability to spread compliance costs among local subscribers; whereas content

101 Id.
102 See Reporters Without Borders. The IlIlemel Cllder SI/I'\'ei/lallce: Ohslacll's

10

III(' Free

F/Oll'

of

Ill/orll/alioll Oillill(" 31 (2003). (II hllp:/:\v\\'W.rsf./rilMCi/pdt;'doc-223(1.pdf (\ast visited Mar. 9. 20(3).
103 Id. at 66.

104 Howcvcr. it should be understood Ihat ISPs should not be required to achievc IO()'!;., tiltration
since that is not a current technological possibility. Lauric. slIl'ra note 24; see Andy McCue. hi/lOo ('o/lSidas
l\i('\1' 11'1/-Id Order. \~I'NH.()~1. Nov. 30. 2000. al http://www.vnullel.eom/analysisIlI14RR6 (last visited
Apr.26. 200S). It is also important to remembcr that perfect filtration was not a requirement in }'i/U)(!.'. UE.lF et
LlCRA v. Yahoo I Inc. et Yahoo Francc. TG.1. Paris. May 22. 2000. N° RG: OO!OS308. obs. C. Bcnsoall1 & .I.
Gomcz. Irallslalioll al'ai/ahle (/1 hllp: i\\'ww,iuriscolll.nct,txUjurisfr, cti:yauctions20000522. htm (last visitcd
Apr. 26. 2(05).
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providers rely solely on advertising revenues which are dependent upon global
access and breadth of content. lOS
The second negative effect discussed above, that many countries
currently restrict ISP liability, may also have a solution if ISPs ean filter illegal
material while still complying with the applicable domestic legislation. The
European Union Directive on Electronic Commerce provides an example of how
this type of restriction may present a problem to private industry filtering:
"Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring obligation on service
providers only with respect to obligations ofa general nature."I06 On its facc, the
EU Directive appears to prohibit all blanket monitoring obligations, such as
requiring local ISPs to filter all illegal material. However, the EU Directive does
not affect specific monitoring cases: "orders by national authorities in accordance
with national legislation," or the requirement that service providers exercise care
in detecting and preventing illegal activities on services hosted by the provider. 107
It follows that ISPs could plausibly install filtering software and block specific

sites made illegal through legislation as they come to the ISP's attention without
violating the Directive. Thus, the WSIS presents an opportunity for the world to
cooperate in amending the Directive and other countries' legislation to permit this
type of filtering.

105 5(!!! Le Menestrel. Slip/"([ note 32, ~ 2.4. Analysts estimated that it would cost up to 25% of
Yahoo I Inc. 's operating budget to comply with the French ruling. McCue, Sill'/"([ note 104.
106 Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31/FC of X June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of
Intormation Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on
Electronic Commerce'), art. 47, 2000 OJ. (L 178) I.
107 lei. at art. 48.
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The most popular criticism of regulating ISP filtering on a national level
IS

the fear of oppressive censorship and undue governmental control, as

explained above in reference to China and Iran. lox Private industry filtering is,
however, only superficially similar to such information control regimes.
Mandated filtering by ISPs docs not bestow new and extreme powers of control
upon the government. France, for example, has already passed a statute making
it illegal to sell or promote Nazi materials in Franee.lot) They have already
enforced this statute in real world situations by banning the sale of Mein Kampf'
in online bookstores. I 10 Requiring ISPs, rather than online entities, to filter the
same content would extend regulation to the Internet without crossing the border
into another nation's jurisdiction. Ultimately, as far as governmental objectives
are concerned, there is little difference between mandating that Yahoo! Inc. filter
Nazi articles from its site and mandating that French ISPs do the filtering. Indeed,
requiring private industry filtering gives governments little censorship power
beyond that which they already possess. It merely increases a country's ability to
enforce its preexisting laws in this new and challenging medium. As illustrated
in this article, many nations already attempt Internet content regulation. I II
Standardized private industry filtering will make such attempts more effective
while avoiding many negative cxtemal spillover effects.

lOS Fagin . .I'II/'m nole 13. al 451.
109 See UEJF el L1CRA v. Yahoo' Inc. cl Yahoo France . .I'II/,m no Ie 104 (finding Yahoo! Inc. 111
violation of article R. 645-2 of the penal code. which makes il illegal 10 display Nazi memorabilia).
II () S('(~ Le Menestrel.
III See

gU/('I'lII/,'

.I'll/Wit

note 32. ~ 1.4.

Reporters Wilhout Borders .

.I'llI'm

note 102.
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Australia's recent implementation of a private industry filtering system
illustrates the effectiveness of private industry filtering,I12 The goals of the
Australian legislation include providing "a means for addressing complaints
about certain Internet content; and to restrict access to certain Internet content
that is likely to cause ofTence to a reasonable adult; and to protect children from
exposure to Internet content that is unsuitabJc for childrcn,"113 In order to
accomplish thcse goals, the legislation gives the Australian Broadcasting
Association (ABA) authority to investigate the availability of prohibited or
potentially prohibited content and allows the ABA to investigate content
complaints, I14 If, after the investigation, the ABA determines that the content falls
within one of the prohibited classifications, its next decision depends on whether
the content is hosted in Australia or not. If the content is hosted on Internet severs
in Australia, the ABA issues a final notice directing the host to discontinue
hosting the otTensive content. I15 If the content is hosted on a server site outside
of Australia, the ABA mandates the ISP to follow industry codes or content
filtering standards, II (,
As compliance with ABA industry filtering standards is mandatory,117 the
burden of censoring content rests soJcly on the service provider or content host,

112 Broadcasting Serviccs Amcndmcnt (Onlinc Serviccs) Act, 1999, schcd. I (Aust!.), lIl'llilah/e al
hllp:i/www.uscrs.bigpond.coll1/baker5ISJall1endcd.htll1l (last visited May 4, 20()S) (now included as schcd. 5
of the Broadcasting Scn ices Act, 1992 (Austi.), (I\'lIilllhl!! III hllp/ .• /www.aba.gov.au/lcgislation/bsa. (Iasl visiled
Mar. 9, 2()05 )).
113 Broadcasting Scrviccs Amcndmcnt (Onlinc Services) Act, 1999.
114 1£1. at Part I.

**

26( I ). 27( I).

I I 5 !d. a I Part I. ~ 2.
116 1d.
117 Id. al Part 5,
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leaving no obligation on the producers of content or those who access or upload
content. IIX If an ISP or content host fails to comply, the ABA may issue a formal
warning and apply to the Federal Court for a compliance order. I It) Compliant ISPs
and hosts are free from civil liability for blocking content. 120 Regulatory strengths
or weaknesses do not lie in the straightforward process set forth in the legislation,
but in the industry filtering codes and standards.
The Internet Industry Association (IIA) drafted the ABA's current
code. 121 In drafting the code, the I1A attempted to balance industry interests with
the govemment's interest in blocking offensive materiaL 12:> The code established
by the IIA "does not impose allY requirement for ISPs to engage in universal
blocking

or content

whieh the ABA deems prohibited."1:'1 It only "requires that

ISPs provide certain classes of end users with tools by which means they can
control the access of content into the home,"12-1 effectively placing content
control in the end users' hands. Additionally, there is no requirement that the end
user actually use the filtering product provided by the ISP.12) The code also
fumishes ISPs with approved filters to satisfy the requirement of providing tools
to the end user.121l In 2000, the list of approved filters rose to sixteen with over

II X Id. al Pari I. ~ I( 2).

119 Id. at Part 6. ~~ K4 X5.
120 Id. at Part R. ~~ XX.

121 Carolyn Penfold. TIll' Oll/ille Senic('\" Amelldmeill. IlIlernel COlllell1 Fi/lers, (/ild User
I:'!lIliOll'('I'm('l1l. 7 N. L.R. ~~ X 9 (2000). (/milahfe al http: ·"pandora.nla.gov.au/parchive: 200 I IZ20() I-Mar-

3"wcb.nlr.com.auinlr, HTML'Articlcs/pent(lld2ipcnt(lld2.ht!11 (last visited Mar. 9, 200S).
Inld.~9.

123 Inliw,try Internet Association. 11..1 COlllell1 Regu/alioll ('ode of Praclice (\'ersiol1 7.2),(/\'(/i/([h/('
al http://www.iia.nct.au,contentcodc.html (last visitcd Mar. 9. 200S).
124/d.

125 Pentl.lld. sUl'm notc 121. ~ In.
126 1£1.
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one hundred more available on the market. In Although the study and criteria
used to assess the filters placed on the list failed to evaluate the actual
effectiveness of the different filters,'2x the market is likely to produce more
effective filtering products than those currently approved by the ABA.124
Based on the Australian legislation's original goal to restrict access to
offensive content, the law appears ineffective because it lacks a mandatory
filtering requirement for ISPs and the approved filters may possibly be less
etTective than the commercially available tilters. However, the IIA's "industry
facilitated user empowerment"1311 approach leaves the ultimate choice of
censorship in the hands of the user rather than the government. Other countries
may consider adopting this approach because it alleviates reservations regarding
grants of governmental censorship power.

D. Content Labeling

Private industry filtering will be far more effective if implemented in
combination with the Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS)'31 and a
standardized content labeling vocabulary such as the one developed by the
Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA). PICS provides a standard
convention for digital label formats and distribution methods without actually

1271d.*51.
12gJd.~15.

129 ld.

*51.

130 Industry Internet Association. supra note 123.
131 For 1110re details regarding Pies. visit http://www.w3.org/PICS/ (last visited Mar. 5, 20()S).
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creating labels or labeling Internet content itself. 132 It merely provides a way for
all PIeS-compliant filtering software to read the labels regardless of what
program gencrated the labcl. Thc leRA works

111

harmony with thc PICS by

providing an intcrnationally accepted voluntary rating system uS1l1g PICS
labels.L13 The ICRA docs not rate sites, but rather provides a system for content
creators to label their site with "an objective, descriptive label."IH
The PICS system has the advantage of allowing each nation to determine
via PICS labels and national law which sites ISPs must filter, all without affecting
other nations' access to the material or restraining online speech and commerce.
Additionally, the labels themselves are neutral and merely describe what the site
contains. Unfortunately, few content creators apply labels on a voluntary basis,
leaving many sites unlabeled and rendering national filtering schemes
ineffective. The WGIG found that in practice, the ICRA software failed due to the
lack of a "critical mass of sites labeling their content."I~S
The ICRA and other label filtering software can be effective if world
governments unify and agree upon labeling methods; and provide incentives for
content creators to label their sites. For example, governments could eliminate
content creator's liability in foreign jurisdictions if they have properly labeled

132 Paul Resnick & Jallles Miller. PIes: IlIlerilel A('('ess COlllmis Wilholll CCllsorshil'. 39(10)
COV1VI1''JICAIIO'JS 01 1111 ACM R7 (I 99h). <ll'IIiiah/c al http://\v\\'w.\\'3.org'PICS·iacwcv2.htll1 (last visited Mar.
17.20(5). All content and IIlf(Jrlnation on the Internet can be "labeled" or identified in the broadcast stream to
"rellect diverse viewpoints" and allow soli" arc to block content with specific labels. Iii. The Pies is
"analogous to specifying where on a package a label should appear, and in what font it should be printed,
without specifying vvhat it should say." Id.
133 Internet Content Rating Association, .·!I/.\·"·C/'S
http://www.icra.orgiElqiabouticrai (last visited Mar. 17, 200S).

10

t-.:!Qs aholll ICR.!, FAQs 1.1,4.1, at

134 !d at FAG 4.2.

135 Working (jroup on Internet Governance,

ISSlle

1'''1'('1",

SIlI'I'lI

note I, ~ R.
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their sites. If content creators fail to properly label their site, they would be
subject to suit in any jurisdiction that has access to the information, as in an
effects-based jurisdiction analysis. Another alternative that would help create the
necessary critical mass of labeled sites is requiring proper labels prior to domain
name registration. Private industry filtering, therefore, avoids the external costs
of an effects-based analysis and can give each government greater control over
unlawful sites.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The WGIG recognizes that "rtleaving things as they are creates

uncertainty on the part of content providers."136 "[S]ome kind of best practice" is
needed at the very least. \37 Each of the three methods discussed above have
advantages and disadvantages. Of the three, private industry filtering combined
with standardized content labeling provides the best alternative, enabling nations
to enforce their laws on the Internet without extending the ctTects of those laws
into other nations. Accordingly, the WGIG and WSIS would be wise to adopt the
"best practice" of private industry filtering to deal with the uncertainty of
extraterritorial Internet jurisdiction.

Jay Wahlquist

136 1<1. ~ 3.
137/d.
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